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Changes in the fraction of workers experiencing job separations can account for 
most of the increase in earnings dispersion that occurred both between, as well as 
within educational groups in the United States from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1980s. This is not true of changes in average earnings losses following job sepa-
rations. A search model with exogenous human capital accumulation calibrated 
to match some selected moments of the U.S. labor market is used to measure the 
effects of changes in the fraction of workers experiencing job separations (exten-
sive margin) versus changes in average earnings losses following job separations 
(intensive margin). While both margins do well in accounting for the increase in 
the college premium, only the changes in the extensive margin do well in ac-
counting for the increases in the variance of both the permanent and transitory 
components of earnings.
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From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s there was an increase in wage earnings inequality in the
United States.1 This increase occurred not only across di®erent educational groups, but also
within these groups.2 Moreover, this increase in inequality within educational groups was not
entirely persistent in nature. Gottschalk and Mo±t (1994) argue that an important fraction
was due to increases in the variance of the temporary component.
I investigate whether changes in earnings involving job separations can quantitatively ac-
count for the increase in inequality in its various dimensions. Why is this an investigation
worthwhile pursuing? Because understanding the proximate source of the increase in inequal-
ity (changes in earnings involving separations versus changes in earnings that do not) is crucial
for researchers who want to build models of the ultimate cause of the increase in inequality.
To illustrate this point, while Kambourov and Manovskii (2004) consider a mechanism that
leads to increases in inequality and operates through occupational changes (associated with
job separations), Guvenen and Kuruscu (2006) suggest that the observed increase in inequality
can result from a mechanism that operates exclusively through earnings changes within jobs.
This analysis allows for an even ¯ner distinction. Changes in inequality due to changes in
earnings associated with separations can come about because the fraction of people separating
(extensive margin) is changing, or because the changes in earnings following separations are
themselves changing (intensive margin). Again, to illustrate the point, the mechanism in
Kambourov and Manovskii (2004) targets the former, while Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998)
emphasize the latter, which they term changes in turbulence.
The Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) world { a search model with exogenous skill accumula-
tion { is extended to include ex-ante heterogeneity. This is done in order to make inequality
between groups of people with di®erent characteristics meaningful. Individuals are indexed by
their skill accumulation dynamics. Anybody who has sat on a school bench is aware of the
fact that di®erent people learn at di®erent speeds. Some people are able to master new skills
very quickly, while it takes others a long time to do so. Moreover, skills that are acquired but
not exercised often tend to depreciate. I focus on the di®erences in skill accumulation between
workers with and without a college degree as a potentially crucial factor in understanding
changes in inequality.
After building the model economy, I parameterize it such as to replicate key moments of
the U.S. labor market in the mid-1970s period. The ¯rst experiment involves changing the
1For analyses of the evolution of wage earnings in the United States see, for example, Levy and Murnane
(1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), and Gottschalk and Mo±t (1994).
2See Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) and section 3.
2fraction of people separating from what it was in the mid-1970s to waht it was in the mid-1980s.
This allows me to assess the contribution of the extensive margin. The second experiment
involves replicating the observed change in average earnings following a separation (while
keeping constant the fraction of separations). This allows me to assess the contribution of the
intensive margin. Finally, I put the two together, which allows me to assess any interactions
between the two margins, as well as the contribution of changes in earnings that involve a
separation versus changes in earnings that do not.
I ¯nd that the observed changes in the extensive margin can account for over 80% of the
increase in the college premium, as well as for all the increase in the variance of the temporary
component of earnings, but only for about half of the changes in the variance of the permanent
component of earnings. Changes to the intensive margin can account for all of the increase in
the college premium, but account for little of the changes in the variance of both the permanent
and transitory component of earnings. Putting the changes in both margins together is not
enough to account for the changes in the variance of the permanent component of earnings.
The simplest way to think about this analysis is as an exercise in ¯nding out what observed
features in the evolution of earnings and labor market outcomes does a theory aiming at
explaining the increases in inequality need to be consistent with. As with all models, the
one I use conditions the (simulated) data obtained. However, the model is simple enough
that such biases are very transparent. Skill accumulation within each group is exogenous and
agents cannot change groups (college versus non-college). The °ip side to this simplicity is
that general equilibrium e®ects that change incentives towards acquiring a college degree, for
example, are absent. Also, changes in returns to skill accumulation (within each category)
only a®ect agents through their reservation wage setting decision.
Ultimately, this exercise is only useful if it provides researchers with clues of what are and
how to model the the ultimate causes of the increase in inequality. The results suggest that in
order to be successful in all the dimensions considered, any possible explanation should result
in increases in the fraction of people separating. Also, since changes involving separations
cannot account for all the changes in the variance of permanent earnings, there seems to be
a role in this dimension for explanations that emphasize changes in earnings within the same
job.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) coined the term turbulence when referring to changes in wage
earnings following a job loss. This is not to be confused with its meaning in the Industrial
Organization literature: volatility in ¯rm-level performance, or in the Labor literature, where
it is sometimes taken to be synonymous with job security or job stability. Ljungqvist and
Sargent's work suggests it is possible to quantify how much of the increases in within-group
3wage earnings inequality can be accounted for by changes in wage earnings following a job
loss.3 In this framework, explicit technological shocks to the ¯rms' production functions are
absent. This contrasts with most of the existing literature.4 Such a departure from the
usual mechanisms used in the literature begs further investigation. I ¯nd that the claim that
turbulence is behind the increase in earnings inequality does not withstand close quantitative
scrutiny.
The focus of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) is not, however, the increase in within-group
inequality. They are interested in how the e®ect of increased turbulence on unemployment rates
varies according to whether unemployment bene¯ts are present or absent. They use the increase
in inequality as subsidiary evidence for the presence of turbulence. The authors argue that the
values they use to calibrate turbulence give rise to changes in inequality that resemble (in some
dimensions) the ones found by Gottschalk and Mo±t (1994). This conclusion is unwarranted,
as it depends on the rest of their calibration, which has counterfactual implications for the
earnings distribution, for example.
The literature devoted to the study of the increase in earnings inequality in the United
States in the last three decades can, for the most part, be divided into two broad groups:
one emphasizing changes in institutions like the decline in unionization rates or the decline in
the minimum wage,5 the other emphasizing technological change. In the second group, some
authors have addressed the increase in inequality between educational groups,6 others have
addressed the increase in residual inequality,7 while others still have addressed both kinds of
increases.8
The approach I follow falls in this last group but exploits a simpler mechanism, and should
therefore be regarded as complementary to this literature. In Guvenen and Kuruscu (2006),
to illustrate my point, shocks to a skill-biased technological production function interact with
endogenous human capital accumulation decisions in trying to account for the data features
described above. In contrast, here, changes in wage losses following job separations, or changes
in the fraction of people separating, are taken as given, and interact with exogenous human
3Throughout the paper, the term \separations" is taken to mean the sum of quits and job losses, while job
losses are the sum of ¯rings and displacements (no-fault dismissals.)
4See, for example, Acemoglu (1999), Lloyd-Ellis (1999), Galor and Moav (2000), Kambourov and Manovskii
(2004), Shi (2002), Violante (2002), and Guvenen and Kuruscu (2006).
5See, for example, DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) and Fortin and Lemieux (1997).
6Contributions in this area include, among others, Katz and Murphy (1992), Caselli (1999), Krusell, Oha-
nian, R¶ ³os-Rull, and Violante (2000), and Beaudry and Green (2002).
7See, for example, Kambourov and Manovskii (2004), Violante (2002), and Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron
(2006). Within-group inequality is also referred to as residual inequality in the literature.
8See, for example, Acemoglu (1999), Lloyd-Ellis (1999), Galor and Moav (2000), Shi (2002), and Guvenen
and Kuruscu (2006).
4capital accumulation. In fact, as far as the model is concerned, the changes in wage losses could
be the result of skill-biased technological change, as the losses following separations increased
more for those without a college education than for those with one.
The spirit of the exercise is to ask what are the minimum features necessary to do a good
job in quantitatively addressing not only the increase in the college premium (which accounts
for roughly a third of the overall increase in inequality), but also the increases in within-group
wage inequality of both the permanent and transitory earnings components.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the model economy. Section 2.1
describes the equilibrium. Section 3 presents the data used as well as the calibration. Section
4 describes the experiments conducted and presents the results, and section 5 concludes.
2 The Economy
At any point in time there is a measure one of individuals in the economy. The lifetime of an
individual is entirely spent in the labor force. Each period an individual faces a probability
® of dying and not remaining in the labor force for next period. This means an individual's
age (time since entering the labor force) is geometrically distributed, with average (1 ¡ ®)=®.
To keep the population constant, a measure ® of people enter the labor force every period.
Moreover, the
At any point in time an individual has skill level h 2 H, a ¯nite set. Let the minimal and
maximal elements in H be denoted by hmin and hmax respectively.
There are 2 types of individuals indexed by i 2 I ´ fc;ncg, college educated or non-college
educated. Individuals do not choose their type, meaning the measure of each type is time
invariant and their sum is one.
A wage o®er is a number w 2 W, where W µ R+, 0 2 W, and W n f0g is compact
and convex. Let the minimal and maximal elements in W n f0g be denoted wmin and wmax
respectively.
When faced with a wage o®er, individuals can either accept it, in which case they are said
to be employed, or reject it, in which case they are said to be unemployed. In the particular
case when the wage o®er is w = 0, individuals are said to be unemployed.9 Unemployed
agents can spend part of their time, si(h), searching for new wage o®ers. They draw wage
o®ers for next period, w0, with a probability that depends on the amount of time they devote
to search, p(si(h)). The wage o®er is drawn from a distribution function that depends on
their type, ©i(w) = Pr (w0 · w), de¯ned on W n f0g. Henceforth, let Ái be the unique
9In this case the accept/reject decision will turn out to be irrelevant.
5probability measure associated with ©i. An accepted wage o®er becomes a wage rate. The
surplus generated by an individual with skill level h, matched with wage w is e = wh.
Individual skills evolve according to Markov chains. The transition probabilities for these
Markov chains depend on the individual's skill level, employment status, as well as type. It is
precisely the di®erence in the laws of motion governing skill accumulation that distinguishes
types.
While employed, the probability, for an individual of type i, of going from skill level h this
period to skill level h0 next period is given by ¼e
i(h;h0). If the individual is unemployed, this
probability is given by ¼u
i (h;h0). The job match may cease to exist for one of two reasons:
the worker loses her job, which happens with probability ¸l
i, or quits, which happens with
probability ¸
q




i(h;h0). It is important to distinguish between the two sorts of job loss because the data
suggests they imply very di®erent subsequent earnings behavior as discussed in section 3.
The evolution of the individual state variables is as follows. At the beginning of the period,
an individual has state (i;h;w). If w = 0, the individual does not enter a job match and
obtains earnings equal to zero. Next period's skill level is h0 with probability ¼u
i (h;h0), while
next period's wage o®er is w0 2 W 0 µ W n f0g with probability pi(si(h))Ái(W 0), or w0 = 0
with probability (1 ¡ p(si(h))). If w > 0, the individual decides whether to accept or reject
this wage o®er. In the case where the individual rejects w, she does not enter a job match and
obtains earnings equal to zero. Next period's skill level is h0 with probability ¼u
i (h;h0), while
next period's wage o®er is w0 2 W 0 µ W n f0g with probability p(si(h))Ái(W 0), or w0 = 0
with probability (1 ¡ p(si(h))). In the case where the individual accepts w, she enters a job
match and obtains earnings equal to wh. If this match dies because a job loss occurs, which
happens with probability ¸l
i, next period's skill level is h0 with probability ¼l
i(h;h0), while if
the match dies because the worker quit, which occurs with probability ¸
q
i, next period's skill
level is h0 with probability ¼
q
i(h;h0). In both cases, next period's wage o®er is w0 = 0. If this
match survives, which occurs with probability (1 ¡¸l
i ¡¸
q
i), next period's skill level is h0 with
probability ¼e
i(h;h0), while next period's wage is w0 = w. By assumption, after a match dies,
the individual is unemployed for at least one period.11
Below are some assumptions regarding the individual transition probabilities.
Assumption 1. Laws of motion for employed: ¼e
i(h;h0) = 0 for all h0 < h, and i 2 I.
Skill level evolution is weakly increasing for employed individuals.12 This implies that once
10The fraction of quits is exogenous.
11This assumption is made for convenience and bears no in°uence on the results.
12Topel (1991) ¯nds evidence in support of the view that the accumulation of speci¯c capital is an important
ingredient in determining life-cycle earnings.
6an individual reaches the maximum skill level, hmax, she will remain there while employed.
Assumption 2. Laws of motion for unemployed: ¼u
i (h;h0) = 0 for all h0 < h, and i 2 I.
Skill level evolution is weakly decreasing for unemployed individuals. This implies that once
an individual reaches the minimum skill level, hmin, she will remain there while unemployed.
Assumption 3. Laws of motion in case of separation:
1. Laws of motion for job losers: ¼u
i (h;h0) = 0 for all h0 < h, and i 2 I;
2. Laws of motion for quitters: ¼
q
i(h;h0) = 0 for all h0 < h, and i 2 I.
Job losers (displaced or ¯red) face wage losses, workers who quit enjoy wage gains. This
assumption is suggested by the data13.
Individuals' period utility is linear in consumption, and they maximize future expected







where c is consumption and ¯ is the discount factor. The linear utility assumption means the
private bonds market can be ignored. Without loss of generality this market can be shut down,
which simpli¯es the computation considerably as consumption equals earnings every period.
There is an ongoing debate in the literature on whether human capital accumulation is
more job (or ¯rm, or occupation) speci¯c, or more general (individual speci¯c). To distinguish
between the two it is crucial to disentangle returns to tenure from returns to experience.14 In
this model, individuals only accumulate skills while on the job, but when a separation occurs
they do not lose all their accumulated skills. In this sense, skill accumulation encompasses
both job speci¯c skills as well as more general skills (that do not get lost once a job ends.)
Finally, note that the modeling of the ¯rm side is kept to the bare minimum. Wages
are simply drawn from an exogenous distribution. This is within the spirit of the paper:
understanding how far one can go in answering the question at hand using a simple search
model where all that matters are di®erences in the laws of motion governing individual skill
accumulation.
13See Polsky (1999) and section 3.
14For the debate on this issue see Topel (1991) and Altonji and Williams (2004).
72.1 Equilibrium
Let V u
i (h) denote the discounted expected utility of an unemployed agent of type i, with skill
level h. It is given by:
V
u






















for i 2 I, where di(s) is the cost of searching. Vi(h;w) denotes the discounted expected utility












































; for i 2 I: (3)
An individual who receives a wage o®er w > 0, can accept it or reject it. In case of rejection,
the individual is unemployed this period, and the value of that is V u
i (h). In case of acceptance,
earnings this period are wh. Next period, with probability (1 ¡ ¸l
i ¡ ¸
q
i), the same wage is
o®ered, so the expected value is taken only over all possible skill levels. With probability ¸l
i
there is a job loss, or a quit with probability ¸
q
i, either way, the individual is unemployed next
period, which has a value of V u
i (h0).
The following proposition states that the optimal policy associated with equation 3 exists
and is unique. All the proofs are standard and appear in Amaral (2002).15
Proposition 4. The solution to equation 3 exists and is unique but for a set of measure zero.
The next proposition states that the optimal policy associated with equation 3 is of the
reservation wage type and characterizes the solution to (3).
Proposition 5. The optimal policy associated with equation 3 is of the reservation wage form.
For any h 2 H there exist numbers w
¹
i(h), i 2 I, such that an agent of type i with skill h, will
accept wage o®er w if w ¸ w
¹
i(h), and reject it otherwise. Furthermore, the solution to (3) is
a nondecreasing, continuous, piecewise linear function of w.
Given the individuals' optimal policies, w
¹
i(h), the next step is to make explicit the laws of
motion governing the transitions between di®erent states. Let ¹t(i;h;W), where W µ Wnf0g,
15The proofs are also posted at http://www.econ.umn.edu/ pamaral/
8denote the period t measure of individuals of type i, with skill level h, and a strictly positive












5 = 1: (4)
For this equation to hold over time, the measure of individuals entering the labor force has
to equal the measure leaving it, given by ®. I assume that those people entering the labor
force do so with a skill level of h = hmin and a wage o®er w = 0.
Letting ¹t+1(i;h0;W 0) denote next period's measure:
¹t+1(i;h
0;W





































The three lines in equation 5 highlight the fact that individuals have three possible origins
regarding their previous period's state. The ¯rst line refers to those individuals that were




i) actually gets the same wage o®er. The second line refers to those individuals that
had wage o®er w = 0 the previous period and evolved to skill level h0. Only a fraction Ái(W 0)
will have an o®er of w0 2 W 0. Finally, the third line captures all those that had a strictly
positive wage o®er the previous period, but rejected it and evolved to skill level h0. Again,
only a fraction Ái(W 0) will have an o®er of w0 2 W 0.
Some individuals lose their job, while others simply do not get a job o®er after rejecting
one, or after having lost their job. These are the people that have w = 0. The evolution of the
measure of these individuals is given by:
16Â(w0¸w
¹ i(h)) is an indicator function that equals one when the wage is above the reservation wage, otherwise
it is zero. This captures the employed only.
9¹t+1(i;h













































The ¯rst term on the right-hand-side of equation 6, ®Â(h0=hmin), is the measure of people
entering the labor force for the ¯rst time. The ¯rst line inside the curly brackets includes all
individuals that were employed in the previous period but lost their job and evolved to skill
level h0. The second line refers to those individuals that had wage o®er w = 0 the previous
period and evolved to skill level h0. Finally, the summation in the third line captures all those
that had a wage o®er w > 0 the previous period but rejected it and evolved to skill level h0.
De¯nition 6. A steady-state equilibrium is reservation wage policies, w
¹
i(h), and associ-
ated invariant probability measures, ¹(i;h;W), W µ W n f0g, and ¹(i;h;0), such that:
1. w
¹
i(h) are the optimal policies for (3), for each type i, and each skill level h;
2. given ¹ wi(h), ¹(i;h;W) and ¹(i;h;0) solve (4), (5) and (6).
The measures ¹(i;h;W) and ¹(i;h;0) are the invariant measures associated with equations
5 and 6.
The next proposition shows existence and uniqueness of the above equilibrium.
Proposition 7. Under assumptions 1, 2, and 3, a steady-state equilibrium exists and is unique.
This framework will now be used to conduct experiments that will help determine whether:
1. changes in the fraction of individuals facing job losses and quits; or
2. changes in the average rate of skill depreciation following job losses and in the average
rate of skill appreciation following quits; or
3. both of the above,
can help us understand the observed increase in wage earnings dispersion both between,
and within the two groups.
103 Data
This section uses data for two purposes. The ¯rst one is to establish a benchmark against
which to compare the results of the experiments involving the model economy and the second
one is to parameterize the model economy. The latter is postponed to subsection 3.1 and here
the data and statistics used are described.
I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) between 1974-79 and 1980-85.17 The
universe consists of white males between 20 and 60 years of age that are household heads.
Only full time workers that are not self employed are considered.18 This is meant to avoid
biases caused by workers that are heterogeneous in dimensions that the model economy was
not designed to capture.
Earnings data and statistics
The measure of earnings I use is the log of weekly wages. The yearly wage earnings from
the PSID are divided by the number of weeks worked and de°ated by the 2000 price index for
personal consumption expenditures published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This is
the most common measure of wage earnings in the literature. The sample is divided into two
distinct populations, those with a college degree and those without one.19
As a measure of relative wage earnings I take the college di®erential, the di®erence in
average log weekly wages between college educated individuals and those without a college
education. This measure approximates the college premium (de¯ned as the ratio of aver-
age weekly wages minus one) for small enough premia. Between 1974 and 1979, the college
di®erential averaged 0.361, while between 1980 and 1985 it averaged 0.401.
With respect to the dispersion of earnings within groups, I use the standard deviation of log
weekly wage earnings. Because the model economy does not distinguish between more and less
educated people within each group, I regress the log weekly wage earnings on years of education
for each group and then compute the standard deviation of the residuals of this regression.
Between 1974 and 1979, the average standard deviation was 0.405 for those without a college
degree and 0.387 for those with one. These numbers are used below to parameterize the model
economy. The cumulative earnings distributions calculated from the PSID are shown as solid
lined in ¯gures 1 and 2.
17The analysis starts in 1974 because before that the college premium was actually declining. Guvenen and
Kuruscu (2006) propose an explanation for the fall and subsequent rise in the premium.
18A full time worker works more than 40 weekly hours. The appendix provides a more detailed description
of the data.
19A college degree means having completed at least a BA, AB, or BS.
11An important dimension in which residual dispersion increased was ¯rst reported by Gottschalk
and Mo±t (1994). By decomposing wage earnings into a permanent and a transitory com-
ponent they argued that a substantial part of the increase in residual dispersion was due to
increases in the variance of the temporary component.20
After decomposing weekly log earnings into the sum of a permanent and a temporary com-
ponent: yjt = ¹j+ºjt, I compute the variance (across individuals) of the permanent component,
as well as the average (across individuals) variance (over time) of the temporary component for
the two periods. Unlike what happens with the statistics presented in Gottschalk and Mo±t
(1994), I do not regress earnings on age. This is because the model economy includes an age
structure. Letting the data re°ect life-cycle e®ects provides another dimension over which to
test the model. Figure 3 presents the distribution of permanent earnings in the top two panels,
as well as the distribution of the dispersion of transitory earnings, in the bottom two panels.
The top panels illustrate that for both groups, the dispersion of the permanent component of
earnings increased from the ¯rst to the second period. The bottom two panels make this point
for the transitory component of earnings.
Table 1 presents the earnings statistics for the sample described above over the two periods
considered. In section 3.1 the model economy is parameterized to match some of the statistics
in the ¯rst period. The results of the experiment will then be compared to the statistics in
the second period.
Job separations data and statistics
The mapping of a job separation in the model to its data counterpart is very important
in the context of this investigation. There are two types of job separations in the model:
quits (which occur with probability ¸q) and job losses (which occur with probability ¸l.) The
exercise ahead will be based on changing either the rate at which these separations occur, or
the way workers' skills evolve after these separations, or both.
The strategy is to identify job losses in the model with permanent layo®s (because a job
ended or a plant closed) and ¯rings data, and to identify quits in the model with quits in the
data.21
I use the PSID to identify both sorts of separations, but there are some caveats. There are
no employer codes associated with each worker in the PSID, so one has to extract information
20These results are subject to the criticism in Baker and Solon (2003) regarding the imposition of (possibly)
false restrictions on the earnings function due to lack of data.
21Temporary layo®s are not of interest in the context of the model, as they are not associated with a
subsequent (costly) job search.
12from the survey questions.22 In the interview, the workers are asked the \reason for sepa-
ration from previous employer". If the answer to this question is \Company folded/changed
hands/moved out of town; employer died/went out of business", or \Laid o®; ¯red", a job loss
is recorded. If the answer to this question is \Quit; resigned", a quit is recorded. This is done
regardless of whether the respondent is employed or unemployed (considering only unemployed
workers would mean missing the workers that are reemployed between consecutive interviews
and yields too little observations to make any signi¯cant inference.)23
For those workers who report strictly positive earnings in the year the separation is recorded,
as well as in the following one, I compute the di®erence in log weekly wage earnings between
the current and the following year. In the context of the model, this is an indicator of the skill
change workers face when they lose their job or when they quit. I also compute job loss rates
and quitting rates for each year. They all appear in table 2. Wage earnings losses following job
separations increase for both groups, while earnings gains following quits increase for college
workers but decrease for non-college workers. The incidence of job losses and quits increases
across the board. These data are used below to parameterize the model economy as well as to
discipline the experiments.
3.1 Parameterizing the model economy
The parameterization strategy involves not only choosing values for the model's parameters so
as to replicate key features of the U.S. economy, but also specifying some functional forms.
The model period is set to one week. Both ¯rms and workers make very frequent decisions
about hiring and looking for jobs. Also, most of the literature reports either hourly wages or
weekly wages, therefore, having a period be a week makes the results directly comparable.
The value for ® is set such that the average life of a worker in the model is the same as
the average years of experience in the PSID sample, 16.6 years.24 The discount factor, ¯, is
set such that the annual interest rate would be 4 percent if a bond market existed.
22The Displaced Workers Survey, a supplement to the CPS, was especially created to deal with permanent
layo®s. There are two problems with using it in this context though: (i) it disregards ¯rings and (ii) it only
started in 1981 so it can only be used for the second period.
23The wording of the question changed slightly over the years, but more importantly, before 1984 the question
was only asked if the respondent reported that they had been in their present position for less than 12 months.
After 1984 the question was only asked if the respondent reported that they had been in their present position
at least since January of the previous year. The universe of people asked the question was thus larger after
1984 possibly biasing comparisons. Since the sample period here ends in 1985, any possible biases are likely to
be very small.
24This number is the worker's age minus 22 (for the college educated) or minus 18 (for the remainder). It
actually di®ers between college and non-college workers. I took the average of the whole sample because I did
not want the probability of survival to be a source of heterogeneity.




respectively, are set so as to match the corresponding data moments found in table 2 in the
¯rst period.
The set Hi contains 21 points evenly spaced between 1 (hmin) and 3 (hmax). The set Wnf0g
is discretized to contain 100 points, evenly distributed between 10 (wmin) and 1000 (wmax).
This was done so that the maximum weekly earnings in the model hmaxwmax = 3000, which is
the maximum weekly earnings observed in the data.
For the remaining model parameters, a one-to-one mapping between the parameter and
the (data) moment of interest does not exist, so a set of parameter values is assigned jointly
to match a corresponding set of moments using the method of moments.
The distributions from which the workers draw wages, Ái, are constructed from a normal
distribution with mean ¹w
i and standard deviation ¾w
i . Since the support of these distributions
is the ¯nite set f10;:::;1000g, they are discretized and rescaled so that they integrate to one.
The parameters ¹w
i and ¾w
i are set below.
Let the probability of obtaining a wage o®er as a function of the search intensity be given
by: pi(s) = sni, where ni is calibrated below. Let the search cost be linear: di(s) = dis, where
di is also set below.
Regarding the laws of motion for skills in each state, while unemployed, and also following
a job loss, skill evolution is weakly decreasing. The probabilities of moving from skill level
h to skill level h0 · h, ¼u
i (h;h0), and ¼l
i(h;h0), are distributed according to the left-side of a
normal distribution with mean h that is discretized and rescaled to the support fhmin;:::;hg.
Following Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), these distributions are indexed by their variance: pu
i
and pl
i. In these cases, increasing the variance decreases the expected skill level.
Following a quit, skill evolution is weakly increasing. The probability of moving from skill
level h to skill level h0 ¸ h, ¼
q
i(h;h0), is distributed according to the right-side of a normal
distribution with mean h that is discretized and rescaled to the support fh;:::;hmaxg. This
distributions is indexed by its variance: p
q
i. In this case, increasing the variance also increases
the expected skill level.
To mimic the concave pro¯le of earnings while employed there is one extra twist. The goal
is to make the probability of moving from hj to hj+1 higher than that of moving from hj+1
to hj+2, for example. Because the points in H are equally spaced, then, under the functional











14where m < 1 is set below. The endpoints are the same, but at the lower end of the interval, the
points are closer together than at the upper end. Then, let the probability of moving from skill
level hj to skill level h0 ¸ hj, ¼e
i(hj;h0) be distributed according to the right-side of a normal
distribution with mean g(j) that is discretized and rescaled to the support fgj;:::;gmaxg. This
distributions is indexed by its variance, pe
i. Increasing it also increases the expected skill level.


















A given set of parameter values, µi, generates model moments, call them mm(µi), that have
data counterparts, md
i. Some of the moments used can be directly obtained from the model's
invariant distribution, while others can only be obtained by simulating the model over a certain
number of periods. Regardless, since I will have the same number of moments as parameters,
I use a simple method of moments estimator, mm(^ µi) = md
i:
I ¯rst describe the moments whose model counterpart can be computed directly from the
invariant distribution. Since the model is going to be used to make inference on how the
earnings distribution changed from one period to the next, it is important that the parameter-
ization yields an initial earnings distribution that resembles the one observed in the 1974-79
period. The ¯rst pair of moments is the average log weekly earnings. Using the PSID data
sample described above for the ¯rst period, I get md
nc(1) = 6:576 and md
c(1) = 6:937. The
average residual standard deviation of log weekly earnings for each group in the ¯rst period is
the second pair of moments: md
nc(2) = 0:405 and md
c(2) = 0:387.
The third pair of moments was chosen to re°ect skill depreciation following unemployment
spells. Keane and Wolpin (1997) estimate that workers lose between 10 percent (blue collar)
and 30 percent (white collar) of their wage earnings following a one year spell of unemployment.
The PSID allows one to distinguish between blue and white collar workers. 95.5% of college
workers in the sample are white collar workers, while this number is 31.5% for non-college
workers. This implies that the earnings losses following a year of unemployment are ¡0:3 £
0:955¡0:1£(1¡0:955) = ¡0:291 for college workers and ¡0:3£0:315¡0:1£(1¡0:315) = ¡0:163
for non-college. Accordingly, I set md
nc(3) = ¡0:163 and md
c(3) = ¡0:291.
The wage earnings changes following a job loss in the ¯rst period were computed in the
previous section and are shown in table 2. The data moments to be matched are md
nc(4) =
¡0:09, and md
c(4) = ¡0:01. The wage earnings changes following a quit in the ¯rst period are
also in table 2: md
nc(5) = 0:079, and md
c(5) = 0:078.
Since the reservation wage in the model has important implications for the minimum
earnings observed and the amount of unemployment in the economy, the sixth moment is
15the log earnings of the 10th percentile for each group in the ¯rst period: md
nc(6) = 6:03
and mc(6) = 6:44, while the seventh moment is the unemployment rate for each group:
md
nc(7) = 0:031 and md
c(7) = 0:013, both computed from the PSID sample described above.
The last two pairs of moments capture how fast earnings grow for each group. A natural
question to ask of a model of skill accumulation is how well does it match features of each
group's earnings pro¯le. There is evidence that college workers have steeper wage income
pro¯les than non-college workers, and this is also what I found.25 Using the PSID sample from
1970 to 1987, let ni be the ¯rst year earnings are reported for an individual. I computed the
ratio of earnings at ni +7 (if in the sample) to ni for each individual.26 On average, this ratio
is 1.61 for college workers and 1.56 for non-college workers. Accordingly, I set the eighth pair
of data moments to md
nc(8) = 1:56 and md
c(8) = 1:61. Finally, because I want the model to
capture the concavity in the earnings pro¯le, I also computed the 15th to 1st year ratio, to get
the last pair of moments: md
nc(8) = 1:81 and md
c(8) = 2:03.
Unlike the previous pairs of moments, the last two cannot be computed directly from the
invariant distribution of earnings. In order to generate them, a panel of 50,000 individuals (for
each group) is constructed from the model's invariant distribution. I simulate their ¯rst 15
years of work life using the laws of motion described in section 2.1 and compute the last two
moments.
Table 3 lists all the parameter values that set the model moments equal to their data
counterpart. The dashed lines in ¯gures 1 and 2 show the resulting initial distributions of
earnings are very close to their data (full line) analogues.
4 Experiments
This section presents 3 experiments motivated by the data. Starting with the benchmark
economy, I ask what the model predicts would have happened to the college di®erential and
the measures of dispersion in table 1 if (i) only the fraction of workers experimenting separations
had changed like in the data; (ii) only the earnings changes following separations had changed
like in the data and; (iii) both (i) and (ii) happened. The ¯rst experiment captures what I
termed here the extensive margin, the second captures the intensive one, while the third one
captures any potential interactions.
25See, for example, Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998).
26I excluded the top and bottom 1% weekly earnings in each year-education cell and demeaned them
164.1 Changing the extensive margin
As the last two rows of table 2 indicate, from the ¯rst to the second period, separation rates
increased across the board. These increases were sizable. Job losses increased by about 39% for
non-college and 75% for college, while quits increased by about 13% for non-college and 28% for
college. This experiment aims to capture such increases. Table 4 contains the parameterization
detailing these changes, all other parameters remain unchanged.
Relative to the benchmark steady-state, separations occur more often for both types. Since
I did not adjust the parameters governing the loses after separations, average earnings changes
after separations are not kept constant, but they do not change a lot.27
The results from this experiment appear in table 5. Changes to the extensive margin are
able to capture more than 80% of the fall in the college di®erential.28 The average earnings for
both groups fall. The college di®erential increases because this fall is higher for the non-college
educated people (7%) than for the college educated ones (3.7%). This is a consequence of the
concave earnings pro¯les. Loosely, in the original steady-state, college educated workers are
(on average) on a higher, and °atter, part of their earnings pro¯les, than their non-college
counterparts. As both types slide down, the relative losses are higher for the non-college
types.29
To obtain the permanent and transitory components of earnings I simulate a 6-year panel of
50,000 individuals of each type distributed in terms of their skill level, wage, and employment
status according to the invariant distribution. Individuals evolve according to the laws of
motion detailed above. A (randomly chosen) fraction ® dies every period and is replaced by
others with the lowest skill level, a (randomly chosen) fraction ¸l
i of those employed loses their
job, etc. I simulate one panel starting with the invariant distribution associated with the
benchmark and another starting with the invariant distribution associated with the economy
where I changed the extensive margin.
Even though the initial variances of the permanent and transitory components were not
moments the method of moments attempted to match, the model has no problem in generating
the sort of magnitudes observed in the data. It falls short with respect to the variance of
the permanent component for the college type (0.158 versus 0.254). The extensive margin
27For the non-college group they go from -9% to -9.2% following a job loss and from 7.9% to 8.2% following a
quit. For the college educated they go from -1% to -1.1% following a job loss and from 7.8% to 7.9% following
a quit. When I adjust the parameters governing earnings changes following a separation, to keep earnings
changes constant, the results do not di®er in any signi¯cative way.
28If the comparison was being made with the change in the college di®erential between 1974 and 1985 (as
opposed to the 6-year averages) this number would be more modest.
29Also, the reservation wage pro¯le in the new steady state is about 10% below the original one for the
non-college types, and only 8.8% below the original one for the college types.
17mechanism on its own does surprisingly well in accounting for all of the increase in the variance
of the transitory component of earnings. It also accounts for around half of the increase in the
variance of the permanent component. Figures 3 and 4 show that not only does the extensive
margin mechanism succeed in accounting for the change in the means of the variances, it also
does well in terms of the change in the whole distribution of the two earnings components.
The top panels in the two ¯gures plot the distribution of the permanent component relative
to its mean. Just like in the data, there is some weight being shifted from the center of the
support to both tails. The distribution of the standard deviation of the temporary component
shifts to the right, just like in the data.
Changes to the extensive margin are not only able to capture the overall increases in earn-
ings dispersion for each group, but also do a good job in capturing changes across percentiles of
the earnings distribution. As in the data, following increases in the fraction of job separations,
the workers in the lower percentiles see their earnings deteriorate, while those in the upper
percentiles experience the opposite. This is true of both groups, as seen in ¯gures 5 and 6.
The fact that this mechanism is able to generate the observed increase in the variance of
transitory earnings, but cannot quite match the increase in the variance of permanent earnings
is reminiscent of what happens in Kambourov and Manovskii (2004). Like in their model, the
channel emphasized is one that privileges the extensive margin, and just like in their model,
this channel falls short when it comes to accounting for the increased dispersion of permanent
earnings, while doing very well on the transitory earnings side. Why? In order for the model
here to be able to generate enough dispersion in the permanent component of earnings, it has to
be that the shock either increases skill dispersion (within each group) by enough, or decreases
reservation wages by enough, or both, as the underlying distribution wages are being drawn
from is not changing. What happens here is that the standard deviation of skills actually
declines for the non-college type from 0.312 to 0.304 and it increases only nominally, from
0.51 to 0.52 for the college type. The action is all coming from the fall in the reservation
wage pro¯le of each type. Improvements in this dimension can be made by having the shock
a®ecting the underlying wage distribution.
4.2 Changing the intensive margin
Looking at the ¯rst two rows in table 2, the behavior of earnings changes following separations is
mixed. While for both groups, the earnings losses following job losses increased signi¯catively,
the earnings gains following quits only increased for the college group, for the non-college they
18actually decreased. This asymmetry will be re°ected below in the experiment's results.30
In this experiment, only the parameters indexing the variance of the distribution of the skill
evolution following a job loss, pl
i, or a quit, p
q
i, change. Such parameter changes are presented
in table 6. The results are in table 7. While the changes in the extensive margin are more
than capable of accounting for the change in the skill premium, they come short of accounting
for the changes in the variance of both the permanent and transitory earnings components.
The variance of the permanent component for the non-college actually decreases (this being a
result of the asymmetry in the earnings changes following quits.)
This results stands in sharp contrast to the ¯ndings of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) (LS).
They argue that increases in turbulence, here termed the intensive margin, can give rise to
changes in the variance of both the permanent and transitory earnings components that are
very similar to what Gottschalk and Mo±t (1994) obtain. The reason for this di®erence lies in
the di®erent benchmark economies we consider. The LS benchmark economy is not calibrated
to match the mean and variance of earnings in the data. As a result, their distribution is
wildly di®erent from the data, as can be seen in ¯gure 7, that replicates the LS Laissez-Faire
economy for the di®erent levels of turbulence they consider. Not only are earnings much
more concentrated than in the data to start with, but they are concentrated at the top of
the support.31 In the economy with no turbulence, the average skill level is 1.88 (out of a
maximum of 2). When LS increase turbulence, which means increasing the variance of skill
losses after separations, agents fall down the skill ladder and the dispersion increases naturally
as ¯gure 7 shows.
In fairness, it should be said that the point of the LS paper is not that turbulence can
give rise to increases in the dispersion of permanent and transitory earnings. Their point is
that as turbulence increases, economies with unemployment insurance based on past earnings,
compared to those without, will experience much higher levels of unemployment. The fact that
increases in turbulence can give rise to increases in the dispersion of permanent and transitory
earnings of the kind seen in the data is presented as subsidiary evidence for the argument that
what changed from the 1970s to the 1980s was something that can be thought of as an increase
in turbulence. I argue that one should look elsewhere for such evidence.
30Using di®erent periods, 1976-81 and 1986-91, and a di®erent sample, Polsky (1999) ¯nds that changes in
real wages increased from 7.5% to 19.3%. He does not distinguish between education types.
31In the economy with no turbulence, for example, the bottom 1% makes, on average, around 38% less than
the mean, while the top 1% makes, on average, around 17% more than the mean.
194.3 Changing both margins
The last experiment uses changes in both margins to investigate whether there is some com-
plementarity between the two. The parameterization for the second period in this experiment
is in table 8, and the results appear in table 9. Indeed, when we compare these results to the
results from the changes in the extensive margin alone, we notice some ampli¯cation in the
changes of all variables except for the variance of the permanent component of earnings for the
non-college type. This is puzzling, as it is evidence of some asymmetry between the two types.
One important piece of this puzzle is to understand why did the earnings changes following
quits evolved di®erently for the two types. This task is out of the scope of this model, as it
requires a model where quits are endogenous, but it seems interesting enough to warrant some
further investigation.
4.4 Discussion
The purpose of this paper is to inform future research. So what is future research to do with
these results? Suppose one wants to investigate if and how technological change gave rise to
increases in inequality along the dimensions discussed here. Consider two types of technological
advancements, the ¯rst kind is embodied in capital goods that are already in use, and therefore
does not necessarily give rise to more job separations (like a better Xerox machine.) The second
kind is of the sort that makes existing production processes, or skill sets, obsolete. The results
obtained here suggest that, if they are to account for the observed changes in inequality, most
of the advances must be of the latter kind. Given the asymmetry observed above regarding the
changes in permanent components, whatever shocks of the former kind there are, they should
increase the variance of the permanent component of earnings more so among the non-college
types than among the college type.
It is important to understand that even though the exercises here are motivated by changes
associated with job separations, to the extent that these changes move individuals up and down
their skill pro¯les, they also a®ect the evolution of earnings within jobs. But this is di®erent
from shocks to the skill pro¯les themselves. What I argue is that shocks of this second sort
are less likely to be behind the bulk of the changes in inequality.
Some of the assumptions used in the name of simplicity and tractability in this model are
very restrictive, like linear utility, ¯xed supply of both types, and exogenous skill evolution
and returns. The question is whether they make a di®erence for the main ¯ndings or not.32
32Some shortcomings of the restriction imposed on the model are actually obvious, but are somewhat or-
thogonal to the point of the paper. For example, a model with exogenous skill accumulation, like this one, will
not be able to account for the decrease in the skill premium before 1974 and its subsequent increase.
20The main point of the paper is that earnings changes involving job separations seem more
important than those that occur within jobs when it comes to accounting for the di®erent
dimensions in which inequality increased. Moreover, unlike changes along the extensive margin
that can account for large fractions of both the changes in inequality across groups as well as
within groups, changes along the intensive margin have problems in accounting for the latter.
The impact of intensive margin changes would certainly be di®erent if agents were able to
endogenously devote o®-market time to improving their skills. Suppose that average earnings
changes after job losses fall. Then, agents would invest less in acquiring skills. If to this we
add some concavity to the skill schedule as a function of time invested, this e®ect would be
stronger for people that already have a low skill level, increasing skill dispersion within the
group.
The paper also sheds some light on the general versus speci¯c skills discussion. There are
many dimensions where one can look for clues as to whether human capital has more of a
general or a (¯rm, industry, job) speci¯c component. A part of the literature looks at how well
can shocks to models with general versus speci¯c skills account for the increases in inequality
in its various dimensions. For purposes of illustration, let me characterize the extremes of this
debate using two papers: on the general skills side, the work of Guvenen and Kuruscu (2006),
and on the speci¯c skills side, the work of Kambourov and Manovskii (2004). Relative to these
two poles, this paper is somewhere in between. Skills have a speci¯c component, to the extent
that upon a job loss there is an expected skill loss, but because not all skills are lost, there is
also a general component.
In Guvenen and Kuruscu (2006), skill biased technological shocks can account for the
changes in the skill premium, as well as for the increases in overall and residual inequality. They
do not present results for the changes in the temporary and permanent components, but my
conjecture, given the results here, is that they would fall short with respect to the increases in
the temporary component, which is where the speci¯c component of skills seems to matter the
most. On the other hand, in Kambourov and Manovskii (2004), occupational shifts can account
for the increase in overall inequality as well as in the variance of the temporary component of
earnings, but fall very short with respect to increases in the variance of permanent earnings.
The model presented here highlights the fact that a general component to skills goes a long
way in improving the results regarding the changes in the permanent component of earnings.
215 Conclusion
Changes in earnings associated with job separations that occurred from the mid 1970s to the
mid 1980s in the US are important in accounting for the contemporaneous increase in inequality
between educational groups, as well as within these groups. While changes in the fraction of
people separating (extensive margin) can account for the increase in both the variance of the
temporary component of earnings as well in the variance of the permanent component (to a
less extent), movements in the earnings changes following separations have a harder time in
accounting for these sorts of increases in inequality.
The fact that most of the changes in inequality can be accounted for by changes in the
fraction of people separating lends support to models who emphasize explanations that operate
through this channel, and highlights the importance of the (job) speci¯c component of skills.
226 Appendix
6.1 Data
The basic income dataset uses 12 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from
1974 to 1985. The sample includes white males head of households between 20 and 60 years
old, who are not self-employed. The low income oversample is excluded and only those who
work between 40 and 60 hours per week are included. Each year, the sample is divided between
college and non-college workers, according to whether the individual reports having completed
at least a college BA. Only those individuals that report at least one instance of non-zero
yearly wages and have a positive PSID weight are included. All the statistics computed across
individuals use the PSID weights.
To compute log weekly wages, yearly wages are divided by weeks worked and adjusted
according to the 2000 price index for personal consumption expenditures published by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. In each year-education cell, the top and bottom 1% are excluded.
To avoid year to year °uctuations, I construct an index of each year's mean log weekly wages
relative to the 6-year average in each period. Log weekly wages are then adjusted by this
index. The averages by education appear in table 3 as md
i(1), and their di®erence as the
college di®erential in table 1.
Within each group, individuals di®er in years of education. Therefore, in each period, and
for each group, log weekly wages are regressed on years of education. The standard deviation
of the residuals from this regression in the ¯rst period appears in table 3 as md
i(2).
These residual earnings are also used to compute the dispersion in the permanent and
transitory components. For each of the two periods, the permanent component of log yearly





6 . The transitory component is then ºjt = yjt¡¹j. The top two panels in ¯gure 3
show the distributions of the permanent components for each group, in each period. For each
individual, over each period, the standard deviation of the transitory component is computed
and their distribution is shown on the two bottom panels of ¯gure 3. Table 1 also shows the
mean of the variance of the permanent component, as well as the mean of the variance of the
transitory component for each group, in each period.
Regarding job separations, up until 1983, unemployed individuals or those whose job tenure
was less than 12 months were asked "What happened to the job you had before?". If the
answer to this question was: "Company folded/changed hands/moved out of town; employer
died/went out of business" or "Laid o®; ¯red", a job loss is registered. If the answer to the
question was: "Quit; resigned; retired; pregnant; needed more money; just wanted a change
in jobs", a quit is registered. Starting in 1984 this question is asked of unemployed and those
whose tenure started after January 1st of that year, so there is a slight di®erence in the sample
that gets asked this question, but since the last year of my sample is 1985, the bias described
in Polsky (1999), if present, is likely to have very little e®ect. This sample di®ers slightly from
the one described above in that workers are not restricted to 40 to 60 weekly hours of work.





i are simply the average (from 1974 to 1979) fraction of the sample of
individuals that report either a job loss or a quit. For each of these individuals (regardless of
whether they are employed or unemployed), if they report positive earnings in the year they
report a job loss or a quit as well as in the following year, the percentage loss (or gain) is
computed and then averaged across individuals in each group and for each period. For those
who report quits I excluded those that report increases above 100%, and for those that report
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26Table 1: Selected earnings statistics
Variable 1974-79 1980-85 % Change
College di®erential 0.3608 0.4006 11.03
(0.0021) (0.0022)
Var(permanent component) (Coll.) 0.1420 0.1652 16.34
(0.0019) (0.0019)
Var(temporary component) (Coll.) 0.0254 0.0294 15.75
(0.0005) (0.0006)
Var(permanent component) (Non-coll) 0.1442 0.1770 22.75
(0.0012) (0.0013)
Var(temporary component) (Non-coll.) 0.0332 0.0411 23.80
(0.0003) (0.0005)
Source: Author's calculations from the PSID. See data appendix.
Note: Bootstrapped standard deviations in parenthesis.
Table 2: Post-separation changes
Job losses Quits
Non-college College Non-college College
Earnings changes (74-79) -0.090 -0.010 0.079 0.078
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
Earnings changes (80-85) -0.130 -0.070 0.042 0.113
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
Separation rates (74-79) 0.067 0.020 0.092 0.084
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Separation rates (80-85) 0.093 0.035 0.104 0.108
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Source: Author's calculations from the PSID. See data appendix
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis.
27Table 3: Parameterization: benchmark
Parameter Value Moment matched
®s = ®f 0.000468823 Average worklife = 16.6 years
¯ 0.999246040 Annual interest rate = 0.040
¸l
nc 0.001336884 Job loss rate = 0.067
¸l
c 0.000392362 Job loss rate = 0.020
¸q
nc 0.001850030 Quit rate = 0.092
¸q

















































Note: For the moments' de¯nition see section 3.1.
28Table 4: Parameterization: extensive margin
Parameter Value Moment matched
¸l
nc 0.001873293 Job loss rate = 0.093
¸l
c 0.000692871 Job loss rate = 0.035
¸q
nc 0.002105313 Quit rate = 0.104
¸q
c 0.002184702 Quit rate = 0.108
Note: For the moments' de¯nition see section 3.1.
Table 5: Results: extensive margin
Model turbulence
Variable Low High % Change
College di®erential 0.3608 0.3938 9.1
Var(permanent component) (Coll.) 0.1519 0.1666 9.7
Var(transitory component) (Coll.) 0.0158 0.0214 35.4
Var(permanent component) (Non-coll.) 0.1406 0.1545 9.9
Var(transitory component) (Non-coll.) 0.0309 0.0423 36.9
29Table 6: Parameterization: intensive margin













Note: For the moments' de¯nition see section 3.1.
Table 7: Results: intensive margin
Model turbulence
Variable Low High % Change
College di®erential 0.3608 0.4248 17.7
Var(permanent component) (Coll.) 0.1519 0.1583 4.2
Var(transitory component) (Coll.) 0.0158 0.0167 5.7
Var(permanent component) (Non-coll.) 0.1406 0.1296 -7.8
Var(transitory component) (Non-coll.) 0.0309 0.0322 4.2
30Table 8: Parameterization: both margins
Parameter Value Moment matched
¸l
nc 0.001873293 Job loss rate = 0.093
¸l
c 0.000692871 Job loss rate = 0.035
¸q
nc 0.002105313 Quit rate = 0.104
¸q













Note: For the moments' de¯nition see section 3.1.
Table 9: Results: both margins
Model turbulence
Variable Low High % Change
College di®erential 0.3608 0.4558 26.3
Var(permanent component) (Coll.) 0.1519 0.1711 12.6
Var(transitory component) (Coll.) 0.0158 0.0225 42.4
Var(permanent component) (Non-coll.) 0.1406 0.1428 1.6
Var(transitory component) (Non-coll.) 0.0309 0.0447 44.7
31Figure 1: Earnings distribution: non-college























Figure 2: Earnings distribution: college























32Figure 3: Earnings components distributions: data








































































33Figure 4: Earnings components distributions: extensive margin






































































34Figure 5: Change in earnings by percentile: non-college








































Figure 6: Change in earnings by percentile: college








































35Figure 7: Earnings distributions: Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998)
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